Introduction: Are International Promises Trustworthy?
In global politics, promises often waver between trust and harsh reality. Great powers may offer assurances to smaller nations, but these can prove empty when tested. Ukraine discovered this when its security assurances for nuclear disarmament failed, and Taiwan saw its Taiwan nuclear program crushed by external forces. This article explores their stories through the key lenses of the Budapest Memorandum, Taiwan nuclear program, international treaties, and security assurances, revealing the dual nature of international commitments.
Ukraine: The Cost of Nuclear Disarmament
The Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 left Ukraine with around 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads and thousands of tactical weapons, making it the world’s third-largest nuclear power. Economic woes and global pressure pushed Ukraine to sign the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 with the U.S., Russia, and the UK, trading its arsenal for security assurances. This international treaty promised territorial integrity and non-aggression from Russia, but it lacked the legal binding force of a guarantee.
The Budapest Memorandum unraveled in 2014 with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and collapsed entirely in 2022 with its full-scale invasion. Unlike NATO’s legally enforceable collective defense—a true guarantee—Ukraine’s security assurances were political rhetoric. Analysts ponder whether retaining nuclear weapons could have deterred Russia, exposing the weakness of non-binding international treaties. Ukraine’s faith in empty promises stripped it of its defensive edge.
Ukraine, Russia War
Taiwan: A Chronicle of Nuclear Ambition and Defeat
Taiwan’s tale contrasts with Ukraine’s but mirrors its reliance on shaky allies. The 1954 U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty placed Taiwan under America’s nuclear umbrella. However, China’s 1964 nuclear test under Mao Zedong’s Two Bombs, One Satellite initiative shifted the balance. Having seen Japan surrender to atomic bombs in 1945, Chiang Kai-shek sent physicists to the U.S. in the 1940s to study nuclear technology, a vision he carried to Taiwan after losing the Chinese Civil War in 1949.
Modeling Israel’s Dimona Project, Chiang launched the Hsinchu Project in the 1960s, leveraging a research reactor at National Tsing Hua University. This evolved into the secretive Taoyuan Project, sourcing uranium from South Africa and reactors from Canada. By the mid-1980s, the Taiwan nuclear program achieved enriched uranium technology, with Chung-Shan Institute head Hao Pei-tsun asserting in his memoirs that nuclear weapon production was feasible by 1986.
The Taiwan nuclear program hit roadblocks, however. Without missiles or aircraft for delivery, its weapons were limited to self-destructive use. The fatal blow came in 1988 when Chang Hsien-yi, a CIA informant, testified before the U.S. Congress, exposing the program. Facing IAEA inspections and U.S. threats, Taiwan abandoned its nuclear ambitions, a decision cemented by President Chiang Ching-kuo’s sudden death and Lee Teng-hui’s weak leadership.
Taiwan Tsing Hua University
Assurance vs. Guarantee: Weighing Commitments
Ukraine and Taiwan’s experiences highlight the gulf between security assurances and guarantees. The Budapest Memorandum failed to stop Russia’s aggression due to its lack of legal enforceability, while Taiwan lost its U.S. defense treaty in 1979, left with only the vague Six Assurances. In contrast, the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, ratified by the U.S. Senate, offers a binding guarantee, treating an attack on South Korea as an attack on the U.S.
In international treaties, assurances provide moral or political leverage but no legal recourse, whereas guarantees impose obligations under international law, with breaches damaging a nation’s credibility. Ukraine misjudged the Budapest Memorandum as a guarantee, and Taiwan leaned on ambiguous security assurances, sacrificing its Taiwan nuclear program.
Lessons: The Perils of Trust and Realism
Ukraine paid for overlooking the flaws of an international treaty, while Taiwan’s Taiwan nuclear program crumbled due to a traitor within. Ukraine lost land to Russia, and Taiwan forfeited nuclear deterrence against China. Reports indicate Chang Hsien-yi collaborated with the CIA for two decades, feeding intelligence that kept Taiwan in check (Source: Taiwan News).
The original text’s quip—“Contracts are ignored until trouble arises”—captures this perfectly. Ukraine rued the Budapest Memorandum’s ambiguity too late, and Taiwan mourned the Taiwan nuclear program’s collapse after Chang’s betrayal. Unreliable partners spell disaster.
Conclusion: Beyond the Shadows of Promises
The downfall of the Budapest Memorandum and the Taiwan nuclear program warns smaller nations of the risks of relying on security assurances. Binding international treaties or self-reliant defenses are the only sure paths. What do Ukraine and Taiwan’s choices teach us? Leave your thoughts in the comments!